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THE ADVANTAGE OF TYING ONE'S HANDS*
EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility
Francesco GIAVAZZI
Universila' di Venezia and CEPR, 30123 Venice, Italy
Marco PAGANO
Universita' di Napoli and CEPR, 80138 Naples, Italy
It is often argued that the EMS is an effective disciplinary device for inflation-prone countries in
Europe, since it forces the respective policy-makers to pursue more restrictive monetarypolicies
than they would otherwise. Itis not clear, however, why these countries should submit
themselves to such discipline. This paper argues that, to answer this question appropriately, one
must consider that EMS membership brings potentially large credibility gains topolicy-makers
in inflation-prone countries: the reason is that not only it attaches an extra penalty to inflation
(in terms of real appreciation), but makes the public aware that the policy-maker is faced with
such penalty, and thus helps to overcome the inefficiency stemming from the public's mistrust of
the authorities.
1. Introduction
So far, in the EMS experience, countries with above-average inflation have
lost competitiveness relative to the low inflation countries of the system. This
loss originates from two distinct factors. First, between successiverealign-
ments, excess inflation (combining with the fixity of the nominalexchange
rate) results in a one-for-one appreciation of the real exchange rate.Second,
at realignment dates, excess inflation countries obtaindevaluations which are
generally insufficient to make-up for the real appreciation experienced since
the previous realignment.
If each realignment were to compensate high inflation countriesfor their
entire real appreciation - i.e., if the first factor were to operate in isolation -
their real exchange rate would fluctuate between realignments, but would
exhibit no long-run trend (and, for an appropriate choice of the initial level,
could in fact fluctuate around PPP). What the second factor instead doesis
to introduce a trend of real appreciation in the exchange ratesof high
inflation countries: for instance, between 1978 and 1986 Denmark and Italy
*First draft October 1986; revised July 1987. We thank Franca Bruni, Alberto Giovannini,
Guido Tabellini and the ISOM seminar participants for valuable comments. Financial support
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have experienced real appreciations relative to Germany of 9 and 11 percent
respectively.1
The obvious question that arises is then: why should a high inflation
country ever want to belong to an agreement such as the EMS? Credibility of
central banks' commitments to low inflationisoften advanced as the
rationale for participation of these countries in the EMS:2
'The EMS is currently an arrangement for France and Italy to purchase
a commitment to low inflation by accepting German monetary policy'.
[Fischer (1987)].
Even perspective members of the EMS see the main advantage of member-
ship as arising from gains in credibility:
'Ifsterling does join, the biggest change will be the transfer of
responsibility for Britain's monetary policy from the Bank of England to
Germany's Bundesbank which, as the central bank keenest on sound
money, sets the pace for others to follow. This would be a blessing: Tory
governments may like appointing City gents as governors of the Bank,
but Mr. Karl Otto Poehl would do a better job'. (The Economist,
September 21, 1985).
The argument behind these statements presumably runs as follows. The
EMS countries where inflation is above-average are presumably those that
have the highest incentive to use inflation surprises and the level of inflation
as tools of monetary policy: the incentive to use inflation surprises is strong
when the response of output and employment to unanticipated inflation is
large, and when the government has a high outstanding stock of nominal
liabilities; the incentive to produce a high level of inflation (even if perfectly
anticipated) is strong when money demand is inelastic, and thus the potential
revenue from the inflationtax- is- high.3 However, when the monetary
authority has an incentive to raise output and to reduce the value of the
public debt via unanticipated inflation, the public will rationally discount
such incentive in forming their forecast of inflation, so that the equilibrium
has the two following features: (a) the policy-maker does not succeed in
surprisingthe public systematically (and thereby permanently increase
'Real appreciationismeasuredinterms of relativeunit labor costs,accounting for
competition on third markets. Source: EEC.
2lhygesen (1979) makes the point that this incentive is what kept the European 'snake'
together between 1972 and 1978.
3This incentive is particularly strong in countries like Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece, where
the ratio of base money to GDP is much higher than in the rest of Europe, despite the fact that
these countries are also characterized by inflation rates above the European average [see Fischer
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employment and government revenue); (b) the expected, and actual, rateof
inflation is higher than the inflation rate that would prevail if thepolicy-
maker could credibly precommit.4 In other words, the set of incentivesis
such that the result of the non-cooperative game between the monetary
authority and the public is an excessively high equilibrium inflation rate.In
this setup, if the monetary authority is able to reduce its incentive toproduce
inflation surprises,itwill be able to induce the public to expect lower
inflation, so that the solution to the game will get closer to the cooperative
outcome.
Joining the EMS can be seen precisely as a way of changingthe set of
incentives faced by the monetary authority: as explained above, allinflation
in excess of the EMS average translates into (possiblypermanent) real
exchange rate appreciation. This, by reducing the policy maker'sincentive to
inflate, leads to lower inflation in the non-cooperativeequilibrium, and
eliminates part of the inefficiency that arises from the lack ofcredibility of
the monetary authority. The result parallels that in Rogoff[1985], who
shows that the non-cooperative rate of inflation can be reduced'through a
system of rewards and punishments which alters theincentives of the central
bank', for example by placing 'some direct weight on achieving alower rate
of growth for a nominal variable, such as the price level,nominal GNP or
the money supply'. In the case of EMS membership therelevant nominal
variable is the exchange rate, that the system constrains to zerogrowth
except at realignments dates.
Below we offer a formal statement of this argument and we investigatethe
conditions under which the gains in credibility delivered bymembership in
the EMS outweigh the implied losses (choosing as benchmark anidealized
flexible exchange rate system where the monetary authority cannot affectthe
real exchange rate). It should be stressed that the central issue is notwhether
the EMS is an effective disciplinary device for inflation-pronecountries, but
whether itis a welfare-improving arrangement from the viewpoint of the
monetary authority of those countries. It is obvious thattheir inflation rate
will be lower inside than outside the EMS - what is lessobvious is whether,
after paying the implied cost the monetary authorities willbe better off, so
that they will be happy to tie their hands. This is in fact theonly guarantee
that they will feel committed to the system - and, in turn,only if their
commitment can be expected to last, the system will enhance their current
credibility. This point - the welfare issue - is obviously the relevant oneboth
for current members and for countries which are now weighing the costsand
benefits of joining the EMS.
'The inefficiency associated with the incentive to create surprise inflation is discussed inBarro
and Gordon (1983); see also Fischer (1986). Barro (1983) and Grossmanand Van Huyck (1984)
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2. The basic model
Consider a country that produces two goods: one is sold at home; the
other is exported. On the domestic market, prices are set with a fixed mark-
up over wages, whereas on the foreign market firms are price-takers, so that,
for given exchange rate and foreign prices, an increase in domesticwages
reduces the profits of exporters (equivalently, one could assume that the
country produces a single good and that firms are able to sell at different
prices at home and abroad). Let it denotç the rate of price inflationon the
domestic market - by assumption equal to the rate of wage inflation. Letq
be the (log of the) real exchange rate, defined as the price on foreign markets,
in units of domestic currency, relative to the price of goods sold at home.
Since we assume wages to be uniform across the ecohomy, it is clear that the
profitability of the exporting, firms is an increasing function of q1 (i.e., it is
raised by a real depreciation).
One of the concerns of the domestic policy-maker is the profitability of the
export sector: we thus assume that the real exchange rate q, enters with a
positive weight in the authorities' objective function. On the other hand, the
authorities have an incentive to create inflation surprises (it,- it) in order to
reduce the product wage faced by firms selling to the home market, thereby
raising their output.5 The interaction between the monetary authority and
the workers' unions therefore takes the form of a non-cooperative game (as
for example in Fischer [1986J).6 The new twist here is that the wage and
domestic price inflation resulting from this interaction affects the profits of
exporters (for a given nominal exchange rate): since the authorities care
about the profitability of the export sector, their behaviour in the game with
the union takes into account this side effect of domestic inflation.7 Finally
the authorities dislike price instability, and this is captuted by a quadratic
term in inflation (ir) in their objective function. This can thus be written as8
V= J e't[hq,+c(irnfl (a/2)ir] dt,h,a,c>O, (1)
0
5This incentive to raise domestic output can be motivated by the fact that distortions keeps its
equilibrium level below the optimal level.
61n its simplest form this game can be described assuming that workers contract nominal
wages before prices are set, according to w,p + fly,, where the last term captures the sensitivity
of wages to demand, and pis the expectation of domestic prices at the time the contract is
signed. Domestic prices are set as a mark-up over wages (p,= wj. Aggregate demand is simply
= in, p,, neglecting the spillover effect from the profits of the exporting sector. In a rational
expectations equilibrium y,=(l/I3)(p,-pfl, and p,=(flm,+pfl/(1+fl). The last equation shows
how the moves of the two players interact in determining the price level in a non-cooperative
(Nash) equilibrium: the union plays its expectation p'=p,; the policy-maker plays the nominal
money supply in, so as to maximize its objective function.
7An additional incentive to produce surprise inflation comes from the fact that inflation
reduces the real value of the nominal liabilities issued by the government, thus replacing
distortionary taxes with a non-distortionary capita! levy.
8Most of the results in the paper do not depend upon the specific form of the objective
function in eq. (1). See footnote 16.F. Giavazzi and M. Pagano, The advantage of tying one's hands 307
where p is the authorities' rate of time preference. The objective function (1)
neglects the constraints imposed upon the monetary authorities by the
financial behaviour of the private sector in a system characterized by
periodic exchange rate realignments. Itis thus only consistent with an
economy that operates prohibitive exchange controls. We analyze the case of
perfect capital mobility in section 5.
In the EMS regime the (log of the) real exchange rate at time t, q, is equal
to the (log of the) real exchange rate established at the time of the last
realignment minus the cumulated inflation differential. We shall suppose that:
(i) the length between realignments is exogenously fixed at T periods;9 (ii) at
each realignment the real exchange rate is set back to a pre-assigned level q0.
The expression for q is thus
q1=q0J;ds,tE(k7KT+T), k=1,2,3,..., (2)
which can be substituted in eq. (1), yielding the following expression for the
objective function:
(k+1)T
V= $e[h(q0 $ xds)+c(xirfl(a/2)it]dt. (3)
k=OkT kT
The policy-maker's problem is to maximize V. His control variable is the
rate of money creation, and thus inflation its: the solution is an optimal rule
for ;, to be denoted ir'. For this rule to be time-consistent, the policy-maker
must regard expected inflationitto be independent of its own actions,
treatingitas exogenous in the maximization problem [see Barro and
Gordon (1983, pp. 595-596), and Cohen and Michel (1985, pp. 10-14)].
Clearly, in a rational expectations equilibrium, x=x, so that no gain will
accrue to the government from unanticipated inflation. The authorities'
incentive to create surprises is thus merely a source of inefficiency, and it is
precisely this inefficiency that EMS membership is supposed to correct.
The time interval between realignments, T, and the initial level of the real
exchange rate, q0, are also outside the control of the domestic policy-maker:
they are parameters of the EMS regime. However, we shall see below that if
the country's membership in the EMS is to be sustainable in the long run
these two parameters cannot be chosen independently from each other. (The
issue of sustainability is extensively dealt with in section 3.) For the time
being, let us assume that q0 is equal to zero, i.e., that at each realignment the
exchange rate is set back to PPP.
9See Giavazzi and Pagano (1985) for a model where realignment dates are endogenously
determined.308 F. Giavazzi and M. Pagano, The advantage of tying one's hands
Maximization of (3) yields the following path for inflation:10
x'=(1/a)[c(1_e_1T_t))1fort(O, T). (4)
LP ]
Eq. (4) immediately brings out the fact that the optimal inflation path has
precisely the same shape between any two realignments: inflation rises
monotonically from the date following one realignment until the date of the
next, when it reaches its maximum - before falling once again, back to the
initial level. Thus, over an extended period of time, inflation displays a saw-
tooth pattern. The reason why it rises smoothly between realignments is that
it is best to concentrate inflation at the end of the interval, so as to carry
over for a shorter period the implied loss of competitiveness. The slope of the
time-profile of inflation is steeper the smaller is p, and flattens out for p-+,
as the authorities give less and less weight to the effect of current inflation on
the future level of competitiveness.
The optimal level of inflation, on the other hand, is decreasing in T, the
length of the interval between realignments, since more infrequent oppor-
tunities to devalue increase the time period for which a given increase in
inflation remains embodied in the real exchange rate, and thus reinforce the
disciplinary role of the system. Moreover, as T increases, the profile of
inflation between realignments flattens out, and for T-9crjit settles at a
constant value (to be denoted irhereafter). The role of the other parameters
of the problem also accords with intuition: inflation is increasing in c (the
incentive to produce inflation surprises); it is decreasing in h (the marginal
value of a real depreciation) and in a (the marginal cost of price instability).
What would inflation be if the country were not a member of the EMS?
The answer to this question depends on what the exchange rate regime
would be outside the EMS. We assume that the alternative is an idealized
system of flexible exchange rates in which the real exchange rate cannot be
systematically affected by domestic monetary policy, and PPP continuously
prevails. Incidentally, this is giving more than a fair chance to flexible rates
in the welfare comparison with the EMS, since it overlooks what many
people regard as one of the main drawbacks of flexible rates - namely the
experience of large and unpredictable fluctuations in real exchange rates
stemming from 'overshooting' or speculative bubbles in the behaviour of
nominal exchange rates.
Thus, to derive the optimal inflation path in the alternative regime we
solve the policy-maker's problem under the assumption that q is exogenous.
'°Differentiation of the objective function makes use of the fact that
Si;dse'dt=$e'ds=(1/p)(e'eT).(6)
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The result is the constant inflation rate:
=c/a, (5)
where the twiddle (') denotes values associated with the flexible exchange
rate regime. Clearly ir7<',for all t< T, and 4=ii: inflation is always
lower in the EMS regime, except at realignments dates - when it reaches the
same level that would prevail under flexible rates. The average inflation rate
is thus strictly smaller when the country belongs to the EMS, witness to the
fact that the system's discipline is effective.
The result isquite obvious; what is less intuitiveis whether
participation to the EMS is also superior from a normative standpoint. To
perform this comparison, we need to compute the difference between the
equilibrium value of the policy-maker's welfare inside the EMS (V*) and
outside the EMS (V*), respectively, substituting the inflation rates computed
in (4) and in (5) in the objective function. The equilibrium welfare in the
flexible rates regime isi" =c2/2ap: it is a decreasing function of (c/a), the
incentive to generate unanticipated inflation, relative to the cost of inflation,
because in a time-consistent equilibrium that incentive is perfectly under-
stood and acted upon by the public, and therefore is only a source of
inefficiency. As shown in the appendix, the difference between the equilibrium
welfare in the two regimes, V'I' - i'I, is
h2 p Te- pT1
A=V*_P*=[(1/2)(1_e_PT)
1_e_PT] ap3
A measures the discounted welfare gain of EMS membership. For T-+O the
EMS regime coincides with flexible rates so that A vanishes. We show in the







Thus, as T becomes large, and the discipline imposed by the system tightens,
the welfare gain increases. The lowest possible level of the inflation rate in
the EMS regime is x, which obtains when T-3 cxand the EMS regime
coincides with fixed exchange rates; the reduction in inflation (ir,) is
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(that is then at its maximum) is simply proportional to the square of the
reduction in inflation.
The intuition for this result runs as follows. In this economy inflation is
only a source of inefficiency. By attaching an extra penalty to inflation, the
EMS reduces the incentive to inflate; since this disincentive scheme is public
knowledge, a low inflation policy will be credible, and the EMS will partly
overcome the inefficiency deriving from the public's mistrust for the author-
ities. Moreover, as T increases, the incremental efficiency gain exceeds the
corresponding cost, so that the appeal of EMS membership increases the less
frequently the country is allowed to realign its parity with the EMS average.
A difficulty is that the penalty that the system attaches to inflation makes
the EMS regime unsustainable in the long-run: the credibility gains stemming
from indefinite membership are thus not really available. The reason is that
our assumption that q0=O implies that the real exchange rate fluctuates
below PPP: it is set back at PPP at each realignment, and gradually falls
between one realignment and the next, thus shifting domestic demand
towards foreign goods and worsening the trade balance: with no capital
mobility, foreign exchange reserveswill be gradually depleted (or an
unbounded stock of foreign debt accumulated). Eventually the country will
have to drop out of the system.1' There are two ways to deal with this
problem: the first is to allow the real exchange rate to fluctuate around PPP,
rather than below PPP, thus making the system sustainable in the long run;
the second isto ask whether, if permanent membership isruled out,
temporary membership can still yield a benefit.
3. Welfare gains from permanent EMS membership
The way to make EMS membership sustainable in the long run is to
design the system so that the real exchange rate fluctuates around PPP,
rather than below PPP. This implies granting high-inflation countries a
sufficiently large real depreciation at each realignment, so that they will
initially run trade surpluses large enough as to compensate subsequent
deficits.'2 If we assume that the trade balance (and thus the change in
reserves) is a linear function of the (log of the) real exchange rate, the sustain-
ability condition imposes the following relationship between q0 and T:'3
11The welfare gain A should thus be computed over a finite horizon, rather than over an
infinite horizon, as in eq. (6).
12We overlook the complications that arise from any lag in the response of the trade balance
to changes in the real exchange rate.
'31n the absence of capital mobility, we assume that the current account is identically equal to
the trade balance. We also assume that the latter is a linear function of the real exchange rate,
q,, and that the authorities' rate of time preference, p,equals the fixed rate of interest at which
the central bank can borrow or lend in the world financial market. The accumulation of foreign
reserves, R, is therefore described by R, = pR, - CA, = pR, - eq, and the path of foreign reservesis
Assuming R0=0, the condition for the stock of reserves to go
back to zero at each realignment isF. Giavazzi and M. Pagano, The advantage of tying one's hands 3 11
q=(1/T)$ .Ix?dsdt, (7)
00
i.e., on the date of the realignment the real exchange must be above PPP by
an amount exactly equal the average loss of competitiveness that the country
incurs between one realignment and the next.
It is apparent from (7) that the competitiveness 'bonus' granted to the
country at each realignment is an increasing function of the level of inflation
at each point in time. If the policy-maker could exploit the sustainability
condition (7) in choosing the optimal path ir, any credibility gain arising
from membership in the EMS would vanish, since he could set q0 high
enough as to cancel, on average, all losses due to real appreciation.'4 Thus, a
crucial condition for EMS membership to be sustainable and stillyield
credibility gains is that the policy-maker does not regard the choice of q0 as
something he can affect. This, for example, could be enforced by letting the
country know that q0 will not be changed if it deviates from the path ir
chosen assuming q0 exogenous, i.e., the path shown in eq. (4). For that
inflation path, and with qgiven by eq. (7), the welfare gain from permanent
membershhip is equal to
A' = (h/p)q + A, (6')
where A is the gain calculated assuming q0 = 0 and shown in eq. (6) above. A'
is higher than A because the country is now granted a competitiveness
'bonus' at each realignment. For c>h/p,i.e., when the policy-maker's
incentive to create inflation surprises exceeds the discounted penalty, the
EMS regime is unambiguously superior.'5 The welfare gain is still uniformly
increasing in T and has a finite symptote
urn A' = urn A
+ ap2
(c - hip),
where the second term is the discounted value of the initial competitiveness
bonus - because limT0q=(l/ap)(ch/p).
If however the discounted penalty exceeds the incentive to create inflation
surprises (c.czh/p), the EMS regime is no longer unambiguously superior. In
particular, for c <h/2p the EMS regime is inferior to flexible rates for all T;
'4One can see this by substituting the value of q from eq. (7) into the objective function (3),
thus assuming that the policy-maker is able to exploit the relationship between qand T. For
the value of qo given by (7) Je'(q_Jjt,ds)dt=O and the real exchange rate drops out of
the objective function. Any disciplinary effect arising from membership in the EMS vanishes
because the real exchange rate is independent of the actions of the domestic policy-maker.
5The discount factor appears in this comparison because an inflationary impulse translates
into a temporary increase in government revenue but into a lasting loss of competitiveness.312 F. Giavazzi and M. Pagano, The advantage of tying one's hands
for (h/2p)<C<h/p the EMS regime is superior only if its discipline is
sufficiently strict - i.e.,if T is sufficiently large. (The different cases are
summarized in fig.1; derivations are shown in the appendix.) Equilibrium
inflation is increasing in (c - hip), that describes the incentive to produce
inflation in the EMS (net of the discounted penalty). As the net incentive
becomes smaller, the equilibrium level of inflation falls. But with lower
inflation, the competitiveness bonus that the country must be granted at each
realignment is also smaller. This reduces welfare.'6
3.1. Seignorage as a further incentive to inflate
The temptation to reduce the real value of its nominal liabilities creating
inflation surprises is not the only incentive that a government has to produce
inflation: even perfectly anticipated inflation yields a benefit generating a
revenue from seignorage. Itis often argued, in this respect, that EMS
membership, by raising the cost of inflation, and thereby reducing the
equilibrium level of inflation, is not beneficial for a government that needs to
Fig. 1. Welfare gain from permanent EMS membership.
'6Consider for example the limiting case as T*c. In this case, as we have seen, the optimal
inflation path is the constant inflation rate n,(c - h/p)/a. If the discounted cost of a real
appreciation is higher than the incentive to generate unanticipated inflation (c <hip), the optimal
inflation rate is negative. Sustainability now requires that the country starts off with a real
appreciation equal to (1/ap)Ich/pI. Rather than a competitiveness bonus, sustainability now
requires that the country starts off with a penalty. If the cost associated with this penalty
exceeds the benefit that arises from the reduction in the inflation inefficiency, the EMS regime
may be inferior to flexible rates; the condition is(h/p2)Ic-h/pI> h2/(2ap3), or c < h/2p. A similar
argument applies for T finite. The particular form of the objective function - linear in q, - may
be responsible for this ambiguity. Giavazzi and Giovannini (1987) using an objective function
quadratic in q, show that for small values of T a sustainable EMS regime is unambiguously
superior.
hi
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tap the inflation tax. We investigate this issue by adding a linear term in
inflation to the instantaneous objective function of the government
VI= Jet[hq+c(irit) (a/2)iv +bit] dt, b >0, (1')
where ithe term bir describes the authorities' incentive to collect revenue from
seignorage. Maximization of (1') now yields the following path for inflation:
ir7'=ir+forte(0,T), (4')
where n,is the optimal inflation rate when b = 0, shown in eq. (4). The shape
of the inflation path between realignments remains unchanged, relative to the
case when b = 0, but at each point in time the level of inflation is higher by
an amount equal to the value that the central bank attaches to seignorage,
relative to the cost of inflation.
Assuming that q0 is again chosen so as to allow the country to remain in
the system in the long run, the welfare gain from permanent membership is
now
A" = (h/p)q' + A - (hb/ap2) [1 - pT/(1 - e - PT)], (6")
where A is the welfare gain computed assuming q0 = 0 and b = 0, shown in
eq. (6), and q' is the level of q0 which guarantees that the EMS regime is
sustainable, now equal to
*,_ * q0 q0 -t-(b/ap)[1pT/(1eT)].
One can see immediately that substituting q' in (6") all terms in b cancel
out and A" = A': the welfare gain is identical to that which obtains when
seignorage has no value in the government's objective function. The reason is
that the value of the seignorage loss [arising from the fact inflation is lower
inside than outside the EMS, and appearing as the last term in eq. (6")] is
exactly compensated by a higher value of the competitiveness bonus that the
country must be granted at each realignment to sustain its permanent
membership.17' 18
'71n (1) we overlook the fact that the revenue from seignorage is really a non-linear function
of it,: the linear term is an approximation to the rising portion of the revenue schedule. If
non-linearity were important, it could easily be accommodated in the analysis by approximating
the revenue function with a linear-quadratic form in it,: this would simply increase the coefficient
(a) on itin (1'). Since all welfare comparisons are proportional to (1/a), this would reduce ,1":
the condition for the EMS to be a superior regime remains unaffected, but the size of the welfare
gain is uniformly lower.
'8This is most clearly seen considering again the limiting case as T,co. In this case
= (hit,,/p2)+ (1/2p)(,lir)2 (b/p)4it =(l/ap) [(h/p)(c + b - hip) + (h2/2ap2) (hb/p)],whereand
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3.2 Permanent membership. Summing up
We conclude this section summing up the two main points that have been
made: (i) the first is that an EMS designed to be sustainable in the long run,
not only is an effective disciplinary device - in the sense that it keeps
inflation lower than in a regime of flexible exchange rates - but may also be
a welfare improving device. To improve welfare, however, the system must
satisfy two conditions: (a) the competitiveness 'bonus' that the country must
be granted at each realignment, and which is necessary to make the system
sustainable, must be kept outside the control of the domestic monetary
authorities - otherwise all credibility gains vanish; (b) the central bank's
incentive to produce inflation surprises, net of the discounted cost of real
appreciation, must be relatively high; (ii) if the EMS regime is designed to be
sustainable in the long run, the welfare comparison with flexible exchange
rates is unaffected by the incentive to produce a high anticipated level of
inflation.
4. Temporary EMS membership
As we have shown in the last section, sustainability requires that the real
exchange rate fluctuates around PPP. This conclusion, however, is at odds
with the EMS experience so far: as a matter of fact EMS members with
above-average inflation have never succeeded in securing realignments so
large as to bring their real exchange rate above PPP [see, e.g., Collins
(1987)] and it may well be that the system, as currently designed, is not
indefinitely sustainable. In principle, however, it could still be the case that
temporary participation to the EMS makes excess-inflation countries better
off.
To check this conjecture, we now assume that each realignment brings
back to PPP, so that q0=O, and let TX be the length of time for which the
EMS regime can be sustained: TX could correspond to the time when
foreign exchange reserve vanish, or when the central bank thinks it cannot
cumulate more foreign debt. We assume that at time TX the authorities
abandon the EMS and return to flexible rates: provided that their decision is
public knowledge, at time TX the economy moves from a time-consistent
equilibrium where the inflation rate is given by eq. (4), to a different time-
consistent equilibrium where the inflation rate is equal to c/a.'9 Temporary
=(iitm,j=h/ap is the difference between the equilibrium inflation rate outside and inside
the EMS. The last term on the right-hand-side of the expression for A" is the discounted value of
the seignorage loss; the first term is the discounted value of the competitiveness bonus. The
value of the seignorage loss is exactly compensated by the competitiveness bonus.
'9Notice that we rule out the possibility that at any time before TK (say, towards the end,
right before TK) the central bank may suddenly decide - with asurprisemove - to abandon the
EMS, inflating wildly without having to bear the competitiveness cost of the this decision.
Allowing for such a possibility would add a new dimension to the time-consistency problem
faced by the central bank. The reason for ruling it out is that the decision to abandon the EMS
cannot be treated on the same grounds as the decision to change the money supply: itis
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membership in an EMS regime that would be unsustainable in the long run
may thus be beneficial so long as the country remains in the system.What is
crucial for temporary membership to yield credibility is that the authorities'
commitment to stay in the system for TK periods is credible. It will be
credible if the decision to join the system for TK periods improves the
authorities' welfare function.
Assuming q0=O and EMS membership for K periods, the welfare gain
relative to flexible rates is
LI(K)=(1 exp(pTK))4 (7)
where LI is the gain calculated over an infinite horizon, assuming q0 = 0, and
shown in eq. (6). LI(K) is a monotone transformation of A: it is thus always
positive, provided of course that the country can afford to stay in the system
at least for one interval of length T. Thus, despite the fact that EMS
membership now implies a real appreciation, temporary participation in the
system may still be beneficial.
It could be objected that this conclusion overlooks the fact that in this
case the country pays an additional cost in terms of theforeign exchange
reserves that it burns throughout the period of membership in the system.
This, however, can easily be captured by the analysis, assuming that the cost
of burning foreign exchange reserves raises the value of h, the shadow cost of
a real appreciation (having assumed that the trade balance is alinear
function of the real exchange rate, the loss of foreign exchange reserves is
also linearly related to the real exchange rate). It will be recalled that A is
increasing in h: thus also A(K), the welfare gain from temporary membership
is higher, if h is larger. Therefore, the fact that now a real appreciation not
only lowers output, but also burns foreign exchange reserves, increases
(rather than lowering) the attraction of EMS membership: the higher the
penalty attached to inflation, the more effective is the system at correcting
the inflation inefficiency.20
4.1.Persistent real appreciation as a further disincentive to inflate
Above we have assumed that, at each realignment, excess-inflation coun-
tries are granted devaluations that bring them back to the same level of the
real exchange rate (q0, that in particular we have assumed to be the PPP
level q0=0 in the previous paragraph). What happens if instead they are
granted devaluations which are insufficient to make up for the entire loss of
competitiveness cumulated since the previous realignment? Essentially, at
each realignment they move to a lower value of q0 and their real exchange
20Notiee that while in the sustainable case the welfare gain depends on the difference between
the efficiency gain and the penalty paid to secure that gain, here a higher penalty unambiguously
improves welfare. The reason is that here, as in the basic model of sec. 2, q0 is unaffected by the
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where ir' is the optimal inflation path when the real exchange rate has no
trend, as shown in eq. (4). The optimal inflation path no longer has the same
rate, rather than fluctuating around a stable level (as in all the cases studied
so far) fluctuates around a trend of real appreciation. As mentioned in the
introduction, there are reasons to believe that this is a closer approximation
to how realignments actually take place in the EMS.
To study the effects of persistent real appreciation, we introduce a single
additional feature inthe model: we assume thatat each realignment
countries with excess inflation are only allowed to devalue their nominal
exchange rate by a proportion 1 Q of the competitiveness they have lost
since the previous realignment. In other words, a proportion %of the
cumulated inflation differential intervened between any two successive re-
alignments remains embodied in the level of the real exchange rate so long
as the country remains in the system. This apparently small change in
assumptions alters the formal structure of the model considerably, since now
the policy-maker will have to consider that a proportion 2 of the competi-
tiveness lost at each date is going to be lost forever: intervals between
successive realignments are thus no longer independent in the maximization
problem.
The policy-maker's instantaneous objective function remains that described
in eq.(1). The difference is rather the real-exchange-rate-term that now
becomes
TK R (k+1)T/ t\
.1 e_1'qdt= j'(qoj'irds )e"dt
0 k=0kT\ kT/
K (k+1)T kT
Je't J ;dsdt. (8)
k=1kT 0
TK is the horizon of the policy-maker and corresponds to the time beyond
which EMS membership is no longer sustainable. The last term in (8)
represents the memory of the system, i.e., the discounted loss associated with
the portion of real appreciation that the country is never allowed to recover
(in fact it vanishes for 2= 0).
To keep things simple, and without loss of generality, assume that the
system can only be sustained for two periods (i.e., K=2). The optimal
inflation path is
iq'" =iq', T 2T
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shape between any two realignments: as time goes by, and the date when the
system will have to be abandoned approaches, the average inflation rate
rises, since the implied losses of competitiveness will have to be borne for a
shorter period of time. The welfare gain relative to the flexible exchange rate
regime, computed over the horizon 0 2T, is now
A(K=2, 2>0)=ii(K=2) +(2h2/ap3)eT(1 _e_PT)[pT_(1 _e_eT)
+(2/2)(1 _e_T)2], (7')
where A(K=2) is the welfare gain when the real exchange rate reverts to
PPP at each realignment, i.e., the expression in eq. (7), calculated over two
periods. For 2>0, A(=2,2>0)>A(=2): the penalty of persistent real
appreciation raisesthe cost of inflation and unambiguously improves
welfare.2'
4.2. Temporary membership: Summing up
The examples discussed in this section suggest that even when EMS
membership is unsustainable in the long run, it may still yield temporary
benefits. So long as the country can afford to stay in the systemthe
authorities' welfare function improves. Their commitment to temporary
membership is thus credible.
5. Credibility gains in an EMS without capital controls
Up to this point we have assumed that prohibitive capital controlsinsulate
the domestic financial market from the international financial market.This
assumption is not inconsistent with the facts: the two largest excess-inflation-
countries in the EMS - France and Italy - have operated strict exchange
controls for many years; among the small countries, Belgium has a dual
exchange market that also serves the purpose of separating the domestic
from the international financial market.
Capital controls have played an important role in the EMS: in fact the
very success of the system is often attributed tothe presence of exchange
controls in countries where inflation is above the European average. The
argument is that a regime of fixed but adjustable parities isbound to
collapse under the impact of speculative attacks on central bank reserves in
the anticipation of a realignment, unless the volume of speculativecapital
flows is limited by exchange controls[see,e.g., Wyplosz (1985)]. This
argument however overestimates the need for exchange controls becauseit
overlooks the role of interest rate differentials as an equilibrating mechanism
21Notice that the term in square brackets on the right-hand-side is always positive because
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in the wake of a parity realignment. If the central bank does not attempt to
peg domestic interest rates, these will move so as to compensate holders of
interest-bearing assets for the anticipated capital loss (or gain) arising from a
prospective realignment. The adjustment of domestic interest rates strongly
dampens the speculative attack, and can make a system of fixed exchange
rates with periodic realignments viable even in the absence of capital
controls.22 The resulting fluctuation of domestic interest rates may however
be very large, so that any gain from free capital mobility should be weighed
against the costs associated with the higher volatility of interest rates. The
higher volatility, however, is concentrated on short rates, and tends to die-
out as the maturity of the asset lengthens - the obvious reason being that
long rates are less affected than short rates by a realignment of given
magnitude. The costs of free capital mobility, in a system such as the EMS,
are thus really the costs associated with a high volatility of short term
interest rates.23 There are good reasons why monetary authorities should
worry about the volatility of short term rates. For example, in countries -
such as Italy - where public debt is high and the liabilities of the government
are mostly short term bills, an increase in the volatility of short term rates
induces fluctuationsinthe budgetdeficit, and these, presumably, are
undesirable.24
In this section we investigate whether, in the absence of exchange controls,
the EMS may still yield credibility gains that exceed the cost of membership.
We modify the basic model developed in section 2 in two ways: (i) domestic
nominal rates are now linked to interest rates on the international financial
market through the condition of uncovered interest rate parity;(ii)the
policy-maker assigns a negative weight also to the volatility of nominal
interest rates.25 The objective function becomes:
22The adjustment of domestic interest rates eliminates the possibility of an unbounded
speculative attack: this is thus confined to the size of the monetary base. Since the domestic
interest rate on deposits of instantaneous maturity shoots up to n at the moment of a (perfectly
anticipated) realignment, one could suppose that at that time money demand falls to zero, thus
depleting all central bank reserves. In reality however, there exist no assets of instantaneous
maturity, so that interest rates remain unbounded. Furthermore, the transaction motive suggests
that money demand remains positive even for very high values of the Tate of interest.
23Giavazzi and Pagano (1985) compare the variability of 3-month 'on-shore' and 'off-shore'
interest rates in France and Italy over the period November 1980August 1984. We find that in
both countries capital controls have significantly reduced the variability of domestic rates: from
(a standard deviation of) 5.2 to 0.5 in France; from 4.8 to 1.8 in Italy.
24Another reason why fluctuations in short term rates may be undesirable is an optimal tax
argument: in a model where agents derive utility from holding money balances, the optimal level
of the opportunity cost of holding money is zero. In the presence of taxes, however, the marginal
costofholding money has to equal the social marginal benefitofthe revenue from seignorage:
in this case the optimal level of the opportunity costofholding money is positive. Moreover, the
solution to the optimal tax problem requires that this opportunity cost be smooth over time:
large fluctuations of short term nominal rates are thus sub-optimal.
25As discussed above, there are good reasons why the government may care about the
volatility ofnominalinterest rates. The volatility of nominal rates is here also an approximationF. Giavazzi and M. Pagano, The advantage of tying one's hands 319
to the volatility of real rates because, in between realignments, nominal interest rates fluctuate
much more than the rate of inflation.
261fl writing eq. (9) we also implicitly assume that the interest rate elasticity of money demand
is zero, and that output demand does not respond to fluctuations in interest rates. These
assumptions seem reasonable in view of the fact that the interest rate fluctuations we are
considering are short-run phenomena, concentrated around realignment dates.
= $ e't[hq + c(ir1-itt) - (a/2)ir - (f/2)(i - i)2] dt, (9)
with f>O and qj defined as in eq. (2).iis the interest rate on a deposit
issued at time t and that will mature at time t + t;is the mean of i over an
interval of length T. We treat r as a parameter of the problem because the
welfare gain depends on the value of,i.e., on the maturity of the asset that
the authorities care about.26 We assume that the foreign nominal interest
rate on deposits of maturityis fixed and equal to zero for convenience;
realignments take place every T periods, and bring the real exchange rate
back to PPP (we thus concentrate on the case where the real exchange rate
fluctuates below PPP, with no long run trend, i.e., q0=0). The path of
domestic interest rates is given by
T
=r'Jit(t)dt,TrtT. (10)
The nominal interest rate is zero on all deposits maturing before the date of
the realignment because we assume interest rates to be zero abroad; it jumps
to compensate for the capital loss incurred on the day of the realignment at
time T'r, and stays at that level until the realignment date, when it goes
back tozero. The same path repeats in between any two successive
realignments. Notice that= (1/T)$T it(s) ds, so that the average real rate of
interest is zero and is unaffected by the fluctuations of the nominal rate.
The optimal inflation path is now
IT
where ir' is the inflation path reported in eq. (4). The welfare gain relative to
an EMS with capital controls (assuming q0=0 in both cases) is (seeappendix
for derivation):
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The expression (12) is positive: thus, in this setup, the assumption of perfect
mobility improves welfare in the EMS regime. The welfare improvement is
decreasing in r, the maturity of the deposits whose interest rate enters the
objective function. The intuition for the latter result is that for a given path
of inflation the volatilityof interest ratesisincreasing in1/and is
unbounded for r-+O (the interest rate on an asset of instantaneous maturity
shoots up to infinity at the date of realignment, if we suppose that this is
perfectly anticipated, as we do here). Since now the policy-maker is also
concerned about the volatility of interest rates, he will have to be all the
more cautious about generating inflation, the more he cares about short-term
(as opposed to long-term) rates: higher inflation translates into a larger
devaluation at the time of the following realignment, and this will then
require a larger rise in interest rates, particularly towards the short-end of
the maturity structure. This is why the shorter the maturity t, the lower the
equilibrium path of inflation, and the larger the credibility and the welfare
gain relative to the flexible rate regime.
Appendix
1. Derivation of A, A' and A" (eqs. (6), (6') and (6") in the text)
The value of the objective function [eq. (3) in the text] along the optimal
path in the EMS regime is
e1)TJj[hqo_hj[c_(h/p)
k=O LoL
+(h/p)eT_] ds[c_(h/p)+(h/p)e_T_t)]21 dt, (A.1)










For q0=O the differences V*_P* yields the value A reported in eq. (6). At
the limits, when the EMS regime coincides with fixed and flexible exchangeF. Giavazzi and M. Pagano, The advantage of tying one's hands 321




A isuniformly increasing in T, as can be seen noticing that
aA h2 ri1_e_lT_pT1
-ap2e[2+(1 _PT)2
where the last term inside the square brackets(1_e_T_pT)/(1_e_)T)2
tends to(1/2)for T-3.0, and to -for T-+co.






recalling that x-sinh(x) =[(x3/3!) +(x5/5!)+(x7/7!) +"].
The welfare gain in the sustainable case, A' ineq.(6')isobtained
substituting in the expression for V* in (A.2) the value of qobtained from
eq. (7), and equal to
q=(c_h/p)/(ap)_(1/ap)eT[(c_h/p)pT +(h/P)(1_pT_eT)].
1 e°
It is straightforward to show thatlim.Øq=O, lim.q=(ch/p)/apand
Iim.o ôq/3T = (1/2a)/(c - h/p).Using these results, together with the results
shown above for the case q0=O, we obtainlim,0A'=0; limA=
(h/ap2)(ch/2p);and limT.OÔA'/ÔT=(h/2ap)(ch/p). A' isuniformly in-
creasing in T for c>h/p,and uniformly decreasing in T for c< h/2p.For
h/2p <c <hip, A' isnegative for small values of T (becauseaA'/oT isnegative
around T=O), but eventually turns positive and has a positive asymptote.
Finally, when seignorage enters the authorities' objective function, as in eq.
(1'), the value of V along the optimal path in the EMS regime and in the
flexible rates regime are, respectively
V'
(1/p){h
(c+b)2h2 [1e_T( pT 1\1)
= q0
2a+ap2L2 1_e_PT








The difference V' is the value of A" reported in eq. (6").
2 Derivation of the welfare gain with perfect capital mobility [eq. (12)]




where V is the objective function in eq. (1).
Eq. (12) is obtained calculating V" along the optimal inflation path shown
in eq. (11), and subtractiong the welfare gain A [eq. (6)]. The value of F(T)
in eq. (12) is
fe_ITrpTh(1_pT_e_T1
F(T)= I2ap2 [ l_eTp2(1_e_PT)2
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COMMENTS
'The Advantage of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank
Credibility'
by Francesco Giavazzi and Marco Pagano
David K.H. BEGG
Giavazzi and Pagano have given us an interesting and elegant paper. Their
starting point is a small country with a credibility problem. Its central bank
faces a temptation to resort to surprise inflation to secure higher output. As
first explained in Barro and Gordon (1985) the private sector will anticipate
such behaviour and the resulting equilibrium has an inefficiently high rate of
inflation. One solution, suggested in Rogoff (1985), is the appointment of an
unduly conservative central banker. Giavazzi and Pagano do not explain
why this solution is unattractive or infeasible; rather they explore whether a
similar precommitment can be achieved by joining the EMS. Clearly what
they have in mind is that inflation prone countries such as France and Italy
effectively delegate monetary policy to the Bundesbank when they join the
EMS.
Before discussing the analysis in detail, it is worth noting which aspects of
the EMS this approach can and cannot explain. First, although the interpre-
tation of the EMS as a device for securing inflation discipline has become
increasingly popular during the 1980s, it should be remembered that such
considerations may have been less important at the outset when a major
goal of the EMS was to reduce exchange rate volatility. Second, to the extent
the authors' analysis is about whether a small country should join a system
with given rules of the game, the analysis explains neither the initial bargain
to establish the EMS nor the continuing conflicts within it.
With these preliminary comments, let me turn to the substance of the
paper. In a world of flexible prices, the policy maker chooses monetary
growth and inflation knowing that the period between EMS realignments is
exogenous (and for simplicity constant) and that the real exchange rate
reverts to a given point (PPP) after each realignment. Against the apparent
benefits of surprise inflation the policy maker trades off two costs - a dislike
of inflation and the knowledge that it is making the economy less competi-324 F. Giavazzi and M. Pagano, The advantage of tying one's hands
tive until another realignment can occur. Since there is no more (sluggish)
inflation and since the economy reverts to the same real exchange rate after
each realignment, the optimal policy has a saw tooth shape. Each subperiod
is identical to any other, and within each subperiod the optimal inflation rate
rises monotonically since the cost of misalignment is smaller the closer the
next realignment. On the one hand, this set up is very neat, since the
repetitive nature of the decision problem greatly simplifies the analysis and
the solution. On the other hand, I cannot help feeling it throws away too
much. Specifically,it cannot explain a gradual process by which high
inflation EMS countries converge to the EMS average. The latter seems to me
much more like the actual EMS experience in the early 1980s. To model that,
the authors would require sluggish prices, which would complicate both the
model and the solution procedure.
I turn now to my central reservation about the paper. By the end of
section 2 the authors have obtained the EMS solution and shown that it
yields higher welfare for the small country that the 'outside option' of
floating. EMS discipline offsets the inflationary bias which is present when
policy makers cannot otherwise precommit themselves. But the authors get
worried about the implications of their model. If real exchange rates begin
each subperiod at the PPP level, and the optimal policy for inflation prone
countries remains to have some additional inflation throughout the sub-
period, then on average such countries are insufficiently competitive, have
trade deficits, and experience capital outflows. Most of the rest of the paper is
about trying to solve this sustainability issue.
I do not find either of the claimed solutions appealing. One solution is to
allow high inflation countries to devalue to a real exchange rate more
competitive than PPP at the start of the subperiod, a competitive advantage
which is gradually eroded by excess inflation until the next realignment, such
that on average the real exchange rate is at the correct level. Not only does
this not accord with the facts - the authors note that high inflation countries
if anything have been allowed devaluations insufficient not oversufficient to
restore PPP - but it has little theoretical appeal as a rule of the game. Either
individual countries believe that their chosen inflation rates affect the real
realignments they will subsequently be allowed, in which case as the authors
observe the disciplining mechanism and credibility are destroyed, or itis
simply hard to believe that the concerted EMS decision on realignments will
happen to provide the realignment which indeed yields different partners the
right real exchange rate on average. The second solution is even less
attractive: if countries cannot afford to stay in the EMS forever, simply
analyse the temporary periods in which it will be possible for them to stay in
until foreign exchange reserves are exhausted.
There is no need for such contortions. Imagine a household which ignores
its intertemporal budget constraint and finds it is overspending its income.F. Giavazzi and M. Pagano, The advantage of tying one's hands 325
Would anyone argue that this unsustainability should be resolved either by
imagining that the household just happens to receive additional transfer
payments sufficient to restoreits solvency, or that we only study this
household 'fora while' before itsassets run out or itsborrowing is
exhausted? I hope we should prefer to reanalyse the problem making the
intertemporal budget constraint part of the analysis. In the same way, the
natural way to treat the authors unsustainability problem is to make the
policy maker take full account of it in the optimisation problem. Crudely
speaking this means that periods of above average inflation (uncompetitive-
ness and capital outflows) must be balanced by periods of below average
inflation (supercompetitiveness and capital inflows) except to the extent the
policy maker is prepared to let the net asset position change over time.
Thinking about it in this way highlights the EMS issue of when a country
should disinflate relative to its partners, rather than whether itshould
disinflate.
As with my earlier remarks about price sluggishness, the consequence of
such an amendment to the analysis would be to convert a repeated game
into a dynamic game: the net asset stock would be the state variable.
Although it would complicate the analysis,it would, like core inflation,
provide a possible mechanism in which to explain and interpret the gradual-
convergence of EMS members' monetary policies.
These are rich questions. Although I have sought to indicate how this line
of research might be extended, Giavazzi and Pagano are to be congratulated
for making considerable progress within the simpler model of this paper.
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COMMENTS
'The Advantage of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank
Credibility'
by Francesco Giavazzi and Marco Pagano
Maurice OBSTFELD
In this interesting paper, Giavazzi and Pagano suggest that a government
that cannot otherwise precommit to low inflation can 'tieits hands' by
pegging to a low-inflation currency. The authors assume a setup in which326 F. Giavazzi and M. Pagano, The advantage of tying one's hands
domestic inflation is suboptimally high before pegging [perhaps for reasons
explored by Barro and Gordon (1983)]. Pegging can make inflation more
costly for the policymaker because external competitivenesss suffers more
between exchange-rate realignments. If this is the case, pegging leads to an
equilibrium with lower domestic inflation. Indeed, the inflation gain may be
so great that the government prefers to have its hands tied. The conclusion is
that high-inflation European countries such as Italy may have gained from
pegging to the Deutschemark (and periodically realigning) as part of the
EMS exchange-rate mechanism.
As the authors point out, the analysis is a variant of Rogoff's (1985a) point
that countries can sometimes achieve socially preferable macroeconomic
outcomes by modifying policymaker preferences relative to the 'true' prefer-
ences of society. Giavazzi and Pagano pursue the implications of modifying
constraints rather than preferences.
My comments on the paper are related to four broad questions:
How does the model match up with reality?
What incentives does the low-inflation country (Germany) have to
participate in the system?
Is the model specification persuasive?
Can a system of periodically devaluing to restore external competitive-
ness cause problems of self-fulfilling inflation-devaluation spirals and
speculative attacks?
1. The model and reality
The major stylized fact motivating the authors' analysis is that EMS
realignments have not fully offset losses in competitiveness by high-inflation
members. The resulting real appreciation may represent a cost of inflation
that has deterred policymakers from pursuing more expansionary policies.
Data such as those presented by Ungerer et al. (1986) show that this pattern
of competitiveness loss applies most easily to Italy (and perhaps Ireland), but
not clearly to France. When CPIs are used to compute real exchange rates,
the lira's real appreciation against other EMS currencies between 1979 and
1986 (first quarter) amounts to 23 percent; the figure is 11 percent when
based on unit labor costs.
Even in the Italian case, however, the currency has not recently been at
the limit of its wide fluctuation band: the Italian government could have had
less real appreciation within the constraints of its exchange-rate obligations.
Further, Italy's current account has been trendless over the EMS period,
improving sharply in 1986. One wonders if these facts are consistent with the
GiavazziPagano story, and whether some liraappreciation may have
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France shows less conformity with the authors' account. From 1979 to
1986 (first quarter), the franc experienced only a 2 percent real appreciation
in terms of CPIs, or a 4 percent real appreciation in terms of unit labor
costs. In terms of CPIs, the currency was more competitive in 1983-1984
than in 1979. Perhaps a plausible story for France is that President Giscard
d'Estaing wished to tie the hands of future French governments by imposing
a high cost of exiting from the EMS. In this regard the system seems to have
been successful.
It is certainly true that other EMS members have voluntarily surrendered
some monetary sovereignty to the German Bundesbank. Article 15 of the
EMS agreement permits member central banks to hold only 'working
balances' of participating currencies - but the Bundesbank has not objected
as other central banks have added DM assets to their foreign reserves and
expanded their inframarginal intervention operations in DM. Thus, the
position of Germany within the EMS has become much like that of the
United States within the Bretton Woods system. This evolution calls to mind
Rogoff's (1985a) parableof surrenderingone's monetary policytoa
'conservative' central banker.
2. What does Germany gain?
The GiavazziPagano analysis takes the low-inflation center country as an
exogenous player, but it is natural to ask what that country gains from the
system, and how policy interactions between it and the peripheral countries
can affect outcomes.
Henderson and Canzoneri (1988) offer an interesting example in which it is
definitely not in Germany's interest to have foreign countries peg to the DM
and use their DM exchange rates, rather than their money supplies, as policy
instruments. Assume that Germany, like other countries, also faces a Barro-
Gordon credibility problem (though perhaps to a lesser degree). Given other
countries' exchange-rate choices, monetary expansion by the Bundesbank
causes no currency depreciation, and thus has a lower perceived inflation
cost than if other countries targeted money supplies and allowed DM
exchange rates to float. In a multi-country Nash equilibrium, Germany ends
up with higher inflation under pegged than under floating rates. Clearly,
Germany would prefer that other countries set money supplies rather than
DM exchange rates. Another troublesome possibility is raised by Rogoff
(1985b), who shows how allcountries that join the fixed-exchange-rate
system can end up with higher inflation if they do not resolve their domestic
credibility problems first.
These examples may not apply to actual EMS experience - in part because
it is not clear that a noncooperative paradigm applies. But the examples do
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complete modelling of Germany's incentives and the resulting policy game.
Future research should examine more carefully the purely economic benefits
Germany derives from its unique position in the EMS.
3. Model specification
In describing complex situations, model builders inevitably face a trade-off
between tractability and theoretical consistency. Several of the modelling
choices made by Giavazzi and Pagano appear to me to sacrifice too much in
the interest of analytical convenience. Although most of these choices could
probably be modified without altering the model's main message, the
approach followed makes the authors' conclusions less compelling than they
might otherwise be.
The model departs sharply from reality in assuming a fixed period, T,
between currency realignments. Presumably this feature of the model could
be relaxed, as the authors have done elsewhere. As the model stands, though,
we are left with the uncomfortable implication that the optimal value of T is
infinity - the value that maximizes anti-inflationary discipline. Thus, an
optimal EMS based on the author' principles would outlaw realignments
altogether. A motivation for realignments requires some additions to the
model, such as output-market shocks or imperfect government control over
inflation.
Central to the paper's model is the assumption that, all else equal, real
currency appreciation lowers the value of the policymaker's objective func-
tion. The justification for this assumption is official concern for the export
sector's profitability. While export profitability is undoubtedly an important
consideration for policy, other equally plausible considerations would seem
to favor real appreciation. For example, real appreciation can benefit the
economy by stimulating employment when wages are indexed to the CPI, by
lowering the cost of imported intermediate goods, and, more generally, by
giving consumers improved terms of trade. A superior specification might be
one in which the policy objective function penalizes absolute deviations from
a target real exchange rate.
Also controversial is the assumption that purchasing power parity (PPP)
always holds when the exchange rate floats. It is hard to imagine assump-
tions consistent with the paper's models such that PPP would hold under a
floating rate, but not a fixed rate.
A related puzzling aspect of the model is the treatment of inflation choice
under conditions of capital mobility. By pegging to the DM and allowing free
capital movements, the home country gives up its ability to affect its money
supply through domestic-credit measures. How, then, is inflation controlled
under these circumstances if the exchange rate is fixed? Presumably through
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The introduction of fiscal considerations suggests a final issue that is raised
by the authors but not, in my opinion, given a satisfactory resolution. That
issue is sustainability. To analyze the sustainability of different exchange rate
paths, the model treats the current account as a function of the real exchange
rate alone and analyzes sustainability in terms of reserve changes. It would
be preferable to assess sustainability in a framework that takes account of
the full range of official borrowing opportunities and the intertemporal
constraints on borrowing. Such a framework would allow one to address at
the same time the role of fiscal policies and the sustainability of external
deficits.
The authors' modelling of current-account imbalances is far too simple. In
particular, anticipated realignments, central to the current story, can have
crucial effects on the covariation between the current account and the real
exchange rate.
4. Devaluation cycles and crises
Anticipation of future realignment have several other effects on the
economy that deserve more complete analysis. These effects show up in the
behavior of asset prices and spending, in the wage-setting and inflation
processes, and in the private capital account. The authors' assumption that
the government can choose the inflation rate sidesteps the possibility that
anticipatory inflation can itself fuel a devaluation cycle. Balance-of-payments
crises that disrupt the fixed-rate system may be part of that cycle.
The simplest case to consider is one with capital immobility, in which
sharp foreign-reserve losses can be minimized. Suppose that the public
expects a devaluation to restore competitiveness as soon as the domestic
price level reaches value, p". Then the economy's equilibrium can occur
along any one of a multiplicity of paths in which asset and output prices rise
in anticipation of a devaluation, pushing up interest rates and depleting
reserves. Once the price level reaches p" devaluation occurs, after which
central-bank reserves increase as the economy returns to a new long-run
position characterized by a higher price level. Public awareness that the
government will devalue to restore competitiveness can thus lead to a cycle
of inflation and accommodation, of a type seen in several countries.
The same cycle can occur with capital mobility but it is complicated by
the possibility that speculators will attack the central bank's foreign-exchange
reserves and force the temporary suspension of fixed exchange rates. Assume
first that the home central bank can borrow an essentially unlimited volume
of foreign reserves from partner banks - at least enough to repurchase the
entire domestic monetary base. In this setting, anticipations alone can again
drive up prices, with a sharp rise in interest rates and a fall in reserves
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continuous time the money supply drops to zero for an instant and the
interest rate shoots up to infinity.) If reserves are inadequate to preserve
monetary equilibrium just before the devaluation, however, an attack by
speculators will force the central bank off fixed exchange rates at some
earlier point. After the attack, the currency will depreciate to its new peg as
the price level continues to rise to the trigger level p.
These scenarios - analyzed in greater detail in Obstfeld (1987) - suggest
that the realignment mechanism described by Giavazzi and Pagano has
adverse side effects not captured in their model. Another suggestion is that
the realignment process on which the EMS has so far relied will become
increasingly disruptive as France and Italy open their financial sectors to the
rest of the world.
5. Conclusion
Formal models of exchange-rate union are essential to understanding the
normative and positive implications of currency arrangements such as the
EMS. The approach taken by Giavazzi and Pagano views exchange-rate
union as a mechanism that enhances the pegging government's credibility by
raising the cost of inflationary policies. At a fundamental level, this approach
must explain why governments can make binding commitments to EMS rules
when they cannot precommit to macroeconomic rules outside the system.
Recent experience suggests that individual members of the EMS exchange-
rate mechanism do attach significant costs to the option of dropping out.
Since these costs may given EMS undertakings a credibility that other policy
announcements do not have, an important aim of future research should be
to model them. My hunch is that the costs are related to the gains from
macroeconomic cooperation that member countries would forgo by going it
alone.
References
Barro, Robert J. and David B. Gordon, 1983, A positive theory of monetary policy in a natural
rate model, Journal of Political Economy 91, 589-610.
Canzoneri, Matthew B. and Dale W. Henderson, 1988, Is sovereign policymaking bad?,
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Vol. 28 (North-Holland, Amsterdam)
forthcoming.
Obstfeld, Maurice, 1987, Competitiveness, realignment and speculation: The role of financial
markets, Paper presented at the conference on the European Monetary System, Perugia, Oct.,
16-17.
Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985a, The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 100, 1169-1190.
Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985b, Can international monetary policy cooperation be counterproductive?,
Journal of International Economics 18, 199-217.
Ungerer, Horst, et al., 1986, The European Monetary System: Recent development, Occasional
paper no. 48 (International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC).